MOG-10: version 1 to 2
IMAC corrected to IMA
Philippine Army
Military Operational Guidelines
MOG-10 | Intelligence, Operational Security and Vetting
Approved by CGPA and VCPA — 18 November 2026
Effective from formal publication in PTS on the announced commencement date. Supersedes earlier draft and review copies.
Chapter 1. General Provisions and Security Administration
Section 1. Purpose and Application
The purpose of this guideline is to protect the integrity of the Philippine Army, its personnel, operations and confidential information. It provides a common standard for intelligence handling, Operational Security (OPSEC), classification, vetting, and the response to suspected security breaches.
This guideline applies to all PA personnel and to others granted access to protected PA information or systems. The duty not to disclose protected information acquired during service continues after transfer, resignation, discharge, retirement or loss of access. This does not independently expand the disciplinary jurisdiction fixed by MOG-01.
Section 2. Definitions
Intelligence refers to information collected, assessed and reported for the purpose of identifying risks, threats or matters affecting the PA. An intelligence report may contain allegations or preliminary findings and shall not be treated as proof of misconduct solely because it has been submitted.
OPSEC means protecting information whose unauthorised disclosure could compromise sensitive operations, investigations, personnel safety or security measures. Non-public information means material not authorised for public release, whether marked classified or not. Internal visibility, a private message or prior access by several members does not make information public. Confidential information is not necessarily an OPSEC matter.
Security vetting is an authorised assessment of a person's suitability for a designated sensitive position or access. Security clearance is the resulting access authorisation, subject to its stated scope and the continuing requirement for a legitimate need to know.
Section 3. Responsible Authorities
CGPA and VCPA retain senior command authority. NSA (National Security Advisor) is the designated successor to ACGPA SEC, reporting directly to VCPA and coordinating security policy and strategic incidents, with ICC and OPMG under NSA through their respective office leadership. The definitive reporting lines are prescribed in MOG-03.
DCS ICC leads the Intelligence Command Center (OJ6) and reports to NSA under the MOG-03 structure. DCS ICC manages authorised intelligence, classification guidance and vetting within recorded delegations. Decisions to grant individual clearances, exceptional disclosures and vetting outcomes require properly documented authority with defined limits.
MOG-01, Chapter 1, Subsection 3 assigns investigations to OPMG and the Judge Advocate Corps. Approved MOG-09 establishes a five-seat National Security Council (NSC): CGPA, VCPA, NSA, DCS ICC and PMG, with defined but limited binding security coordination and urgent protective powers from its effective date. Neither the NSA designation nor NSC membership creates independent investigative, disciplinary, discharge or appeal powers. Security assessments do not prove misconduct. Proceedings remain with the authorities established under MOG-01, MOG-02 and MOG-08, and conflicted officials shall recuse themselves.
Section 4. General Security Principles
Access to protected information requires documented authorisation, a genuine need to know and the minimum rights needed for the assigned duty. Clearance eligibility and need to know are separate requirements, both of which must be satisfied. Rank, office membership, possession of a link, personal familiarity or attendance at a meeting does not itself confer access. Unmarked non-public information is not free for disclosure.
Security measures must be proportionate to the risk identified. Records shall distinguish verified facts from unverified reports; personnel affected by adverse findings shall be treated fairly and afforded the review mechanisms established by this guideline and the applicable MOGs.
Chapter 2. Intelligence Management
Section 1. Collection and Submission
Intelligence activity conducted on behalf of the PA shall be approved through DCS ICC or another person expressly authorised by the appropriate command authority. Personnel shall not undertake independent intelligence operations, impersonate authorised officers, or obtain restricted materials outside their approved duties.
Suspected Articles of War violations shall be submitted using the MOG-01 Incident Report Form. An active suspected leak or compromise may first be alerted through an authorised restricted channel for immediate protective steps, followed by the required report. DCS ICC and NSA may receive security alerts and refer possible misconduct to OPMG or JAG for investigation. Once approved MOG-09 takes effect, significant or multi-office threats may be escalated to NSC for coordinated safeguards without taking over an investigation. If the ordinary recipient is implicated, escalate to an uninvolved competent superior.
Section 2. Assessment and Verification
The receiving officer shall record the report date, available source information, reliability, known facts, unresolved allegations and any actions taken. Original evidence, including screenshots, message links and timestamps where available, shall be preserved without alteration in a restricted location. An access and transfer record shall be maintained where feasible. An intelligence assessment is not a disciplinary finding; competent investigators decide how evidence is assessed under MOG-01.
Until reviewed, sensitive submissions shall be handled as restricted material. This provisional protection is not a determination that every report is Secret or Top Secret, and does not establish guilt or misconduct by any named person.
Section 3. Intelligence Dissemination
DCS ICC may distribute intelligence only within a recorded delegation, to recipients whose duties, need to know and access permission have been verified. The originating office's restrictions remain in force. Redacted or summarised reports shall be used where full source disclosure is unnecessary. Material disclosures and exceptions shall identify the recipient, purpose, authorising official and date in a controlled register.
Information provided by external organisations shall remain subject to the valid restrictions under which it was supplied. No internal report, screenshot, document, briefing, message excerpt, verbal summary or reconstructable combination of details shall be sent to an external organisation, personal account or unapproved channel without the record owner's and, where required, command's documented release approval. Dividing a disclosure into smaller parts is not an exception.
Chapter 3. Information Classification and Handling
Section 1. Classification Standards
The PA shall use four internal information categories . These categories describe the sensitivity of information within the organisation; they do not constitute governmental classification under Philippine law.
UNCLASSIFIED
Information that does not require a security classification. Unclassified does not necessarily mean public: an internal notice or ordinary administrative record may still require approval before external publication.
CONFIDENTIAL
Information whose disclosure could prejudice administration, personal privacy, non-public deliberations or routine security activity. Vetting records, complaints, disciplinary case evidence and non-public JAG appeals or pardon material shall be treated at least as Confidential by default unless the competent record owner documents a justified alternative designation. Necessary procedural access for a person affected by a case shall be preserved.
SECRET
Information whose disclosure could seriously compromise active security measures, investigations, intelligence operations, protected identities, or material operational plans. An OPSEC concern shall be assessed for this level based on the actual harm that disclosure could cause; not every OPSEC-labelled document is automatically Secret.
TOP SECRET
Information whose disclosure could cause exceptionally grave harm to the PA's most sensitive intelligence capabilities, confidential sources, or critical security operations. Use of this level must be exceptional and supported by a documented assessment.
Section 2. Classification Decisions
The originating authorised office shall assign an initial handling level and identify a record owner. Material plainly non-public shall remain restricted even if unmarked. DCS ICC may classify intelligence products only within delegated authority; JAG, OPMG and other office-owned records remain subject to the relevant owner and competent review authority. Classification shall not be raised to conceal misconduct, defeat an appeal or obstruct authorised oversight.
Where its format permits, each restricted document shall show its handling level, responsible office, date and distribution restrictions. Material whose format cannot carry a label, including Discord messages and screenshots, retains the handling restrictions of its original context. Silence, a missing marking or an earlier informal disclosure is not permission to distribute it. A disputed classification may be reviewed through an authorised restricted channel .
Section 3. Access and Storage
Protected material shall be kept in approved, access-controlled PA systems . Copies, screenshots, forwarded messages, exports, backups and summaries inherit the source's restrictions. Private channels, personal cloud drives, external automated services or temporary transfers do not provide exemptions. Access permissions must be reviewed following role changes and unneeded shares or copies must be revoked or removed under approved retention rules MOG-01 Article 17a governs knowing unauthorised access, copying and retention.
Personnel shall not share passwords, access tokens, private channel links, or other credentials. Uploading protected PA information to external AI tools, automated services or personal accounts is prohibited unless the responsible authority has specifically approved that use and the applicable data-handling safeguards.
An individual granted access shall not disclose the material further merely because another individual holds a higher rank or works in a related department. Access and any onward distribution must remain tied to the recipient's authorised function.
Section 4. JAG Proceedings, Appeals and Pardons
JAG legal casework, appeals and pardon materials, disciplinary representations, and case evidence held by JAG, PAC, GHQ or another competent office shall normally be Confidential and limited to authorised case personnel, decision-makers and persons exercising procedural rights. The responsible office retains control of its own records. In particular, MOG-01 assigns appeals from OPMG disciplinary decisions to PAC, while MOG-08, Chapter 3 establishes separate discharge and reinstatement-appeal procedures involving GHQ and, in specified circumstances, PAC. DCS ICC and the NSC have no general entitlement to such files merely because a matter raises security concerns. Security may advise on genuine OPSEC risks but shall not assume the case-owning office's jurisdiction.
A JAG record becomes an OPSEC matter when its contents disclose protected operational information, intelligence sources, confidential methods, an active sensitive investigation or a comparable security risk. A case shall not be labelled OPSEC solely because it is an appeal, a pardon request, or a matter handled by JAG.
A person affected by an allegation or adverse decision shall receive sufficient information to understand and answer it under the applicable procedure, subject to specific and reasoned protection of genuinely sensitive evidence. Where redaction would materially impair a response, the competent reviewing body should consider a protected summary or other fair review method. Publication of case outcomes requires the case-owning authority's permission. Appeals against OPMG disciplinary decisions remain within PAC's authority under MOG-01; discharge, reinstatement and Never Rehire review remain governed by MOG-08 and their stated procedures and conditions.
Section 5. Review, Release and Retention
Protected material shall be reconsidered when the risk changes, access is no longer needed, an appeal requires review or release is proposed. Only the record-owning office or competent reviewing authority may authorise downgrading or release. Neither DCS ICC, NSA nor NSC may unilaterally disclose JAG, OPMG or other office-owned case materials absent a valid documented delegation. Any exception shall state the affected material, recipients, purpose, authorising official and duration.
Intelligence, vetting, incident and JAG records shall follow a documented retention and disposal schedule authorised by the responsible office. Evidence relevant to an open complaint, investigation, access challenge or appeal shall not be altered or deleted until that process and available reviews have concluded. The system owner shall record authorised disposal and access where feasible. Unnecessary real-world personal data shall not be collected or retained.
Chapter 4. Operational Security (opsec)
Section 1. Protected Operational Information
Depending on sensitivity, OPSEC may apply to non-public operational planning, intelligence sources, ongoing investigations, internal access arrangements, security vulnerabilities, planned enforcement measures, sensitive inter-organisational correspondence and unreleased command decisions.
Screenshots of private channels, internal meeting discussions, officer briefings or restricted documents are not automatically public merely because they can be viewed by multiple PA personnel. Before sharing, members must determine whether the recipient is authorised and whether the content has been cleared for release.
Section 2. Prohibited Conduct
No member shall disclose protected information to unauthorised people, publish it in unapproved channels, obtain it improperly or procure another person to reveal it. This includes private messages, screenshots, cropped images, paraphrases, verbal descriptions, links, hints and information assembled from several smaller disclosures. Removal of a label, use of another account or reliance on a recipient's seniority does not authorise a leak.
An inadvertent disclosure remains a reportable security incident. MOG-01 Article 17 addresses secrecy breaches regardless of intention and the leaking of non-public information; this guideline creates no exemption from that article. An authorised report to a competent official for a legitimate procedural purpose is not an unauthorised public disclosure. Whether conduct satisfies Article 17, and the relevant consequence, shall be decided by the competent authority under the Articles of War.
Section 3. Reporting a Suspected OPSEC Breach
A suspected leak, lost restricted file, unauthorised sharing or compromised account shall be reported without undue delay, normally within 24 hours of discovery . An urgent alert may initially be sent through an authorised restricted channel to prevent further exposure. If the incident appears to violate the Articles of War, the Incident Report Form required by MOG-01, Chapter 1, Subsection 4 shall also be completed as soon as practicable. Where the normal receiving officer is implicated or unavailable, the report shall be escalated securely to an uninvolved competent authority; where CGPA and VCPA are implicated, the established superior command route shall be used without presuming that this guideline creates a new investigating body. The report shall identify the known material, timing, channels, recipients and containment actions; delay beyond the normal reporting period shall be explained.
Relevant evidence shall be preserved unchanged in a restricted location with timestamps, message references and a record of handling where possible. A person reporting a breach shall not worsen it by sending copies to uninvolved members, posting leaks publicly, deleting evidence to conceal the event, publicly confronting the alleged offender or running an unauthorised investigation. A good-faith report may provide necessary evidence only through the authorised channel; unsupported allegations are not proven findings MOG-01 Article 17c governs intentional obstruction of security proceedings.
Section 4. Containment, Investigation and Corrective Measures
For a credible immediate security risk, an authorised officer may request a narrowly scoped temporary access restriction from the competent system or access controller. Record the grounds, affected access, authoriser, start time and review deadline. Under this approved MOG-10, from its effective date, the restriction must receive independent review within 72 hours; CGPA or VCPA may authorise one documented exceptional extension of no more than 72 hours. If an NSC provisional protective hold under MOG-09 is also used, that hold separately expires within 24 hours unless CGPA/VCPA confirms it in writing. Neither deadline enlarges the other authority. Any continuing restriction requires a reasoned clearance or access decision and appropriate review route. Expiry does not itself grant access otherwise prohibited by clearance or need-to-know requirements. The affected person must be given a fair opportunity to respond once immediate containment permits.
Where an Articles of War violation is reasonably suspected, the report and preserved evidence shall be referred to OPMG or JAG for independent investigation as provided by MOG-01. ICC may issue infractions under Articles 17, 17a and 17b only through a duly authorised ICC officer and within the procedural requirements of MOG-01. Article 17c and 17d issuing authority remains with OPMG and GHQ; ICC has no authority to issue these articles or investigate its own alleged misconduct. All disciplinary action requires sufficient established evidence and the applicable opportunity to respond, and remains subject to PAC appeals. No investigative powers or discharge, Never Rehire or appeal authority is transferred by this guideline.
Chapter 5. Security Vetting and Access Clearance
Section 1. Positions Requiring Vetting
Positions involving intelligence operations, confidential cases, privileged systems, security administration, external security liaison or access to Secret or Top Secret material shall be designated for prior vetting. Required vetting must be completed before the relevant role-based privileges or sensitive access are granted. Acting duty, senior rank, temporary assignment or a verbal instruction shall not exempt a person from that requirement.
DCS ICC shall coordinate security vetting under NSA oversight, with necessary authorised input from OPMG or other offices. Vetting assesses suitability for specified sensitive duties and access, not general loyalty. Applicants, sponsors and conflicted assessors may not decide their own cases, and vetting must not be used to collect unrelated real-world personal information.
Section 2. Request, Notice and Consent
A vetting request shall identify the candidate, proposed role, sponsoring office, required access and referring official. The candidate shall be informed of the nature of the vetting and the type of information reasonably necessary for the assessment.
Vetting shall rely on authorised PA records, relevant evidenced conduct and information lawfully and voluntarily provided for the stated purpose. No officer may demand passwords, access to private accounts, unrelated correspondence, real-world addresses, health details or other unnecessary personal identifiers. Refusing an inappropriate request shall not itself be misconduct; absence of information genuinely essential to sensitive access may justify a documented suitability decision limited to the proposed position.
Section 3. Assessment Criteria
Relevant criteria may include a demonstrated history of complying with security rules, reliability in prior appointments, substantiated misconduct, conflicts of interest, misuse of sensitive information, undisclosed responsibilities that materially affect impartiality, and the level of access requested.
Vetting must distinguish substantiated conduct from rumours and unverified allegations. Unsupported accusations, association alone, protected personal characteristics or personal disputes shall not by themselves justify denial. Assessors with personal or organisational conflicts must disclose and recuse themselves. Where feasible, the applicant shall have a chance to correct material factual errors before an adverse final decision; genuinely confidential source identities may be protected while giving a meaningful summary.
Section 4. Determinations and Authorisation
A vetting decision shall state Approved, Approved with Conditions, Deferred Pending Information or Denied. It shall record the decision-maker, approved access and role, substantiated grounds, limitations, date and next review date. A pending or deferred vetting request is not permission to grant sensitive access. Conditions must be specific, proportionate and time-limited. A denied clearance concerns suitability for designated access and is not itself a demotion, promotion lock, General Discharge, Dishonourable Discharge or Never Rehire determination. Those actions remain governed by the competent authorities and procedures in MOG-01, MOG-02 and MOG-08.
DCS ICC may decide ordinary vetting matters only under an express written delegation; otherwise the office shall recommend a decision to the authorised approving authority. Disputed, exceptional and high-sensitivity matters shall go to an uninvolved competent superior. No applicant, sponsor or reviewer may approve their own clearance, disregard a documented denial by moving to another office, or grant access beyond the approved role. Decisions and restrictions follow the individual until reviewed or lawfully superseded MOG-01 Article 17b governs deliberate vetting and clearance circumvention.
Vetting approval does not itself appoint a person to office, authorise investigative powers or provide unrestricted access to all information at an approved classification level. The appointing and system-owning authorities must separately authorise role and access. Conversely, vetting denial or revocation may restrict a sensitive appointment but shall not on its own terminate membership, block a promotion or prevent an otherwise authorised reinstatement. Any separate personnel decision must follow MOG-02 and MOG-08 as applicable.
Section 5. Continuing Eligibility and Access Removal
Clearance and access shall be reviewed following a role change, departure, security incident, newly identified risk or the expiry of an authorisation. An ongoing sensitive clearance shall have a recorded validity period of no longer than six months, after which it expires unless renewed following review; an expired clearance cannot support new or continued sensitive access. Access no longer required must be withdrawn promptly, normally within 24 hours of the controller receiving notice. All suspensions, restrictions and revocations shall record their basis, approving official, effective time and review path.
A credible immediate security risk may justify a narrowly limited protective access restriction pending vetting or investigation, subject to the 72-hour independent review and exceptional-extension rules in Chapter 4, Section 4. When a provisional NSC hold under MOG-09 is invoked after that MOG takes effect, its separate 24-hour confirmation-or-expiry rule also applies. These measures are protective, not convictions or permanent disciplinary decisions. CGPA or VCPA may authorise narrowly scoped, logged exceptional operational access in writing for no more than 24 hours before review. Such approval confers neither general clearance nor access to unrelated protected case material; routine inconvenience is not an emergency.
Section 6. Review of Vetting Decisions
A candidate may request reconsideration of a denied, conditioned, suspended or revoked security clearance within 14 calendar days of notice, with corrections and evidence. A decision made by DCS ICC requires independent review by NSA or another competent uninvolved superior; where NSA is implicated, CGPA, VCPA or another competent uninvolved superior shall review instead. A written determination should be made within 14 calendar days of a complete request, with one documented extension of no more than 14 days. Failure to decide requires escalation and does not grant clearance automatically. This process does not replace PAC disciplinary appeals under MOG-01 or discharge and reinstatement procedures under MOG-08.
JAG advice may be sought where fairness, confidential evidence or procedural rights are disputed. This administrative review concerns access suitability only: an appeal from a disciplinary sanction must follow the procedure and competent reviewing body established by MOG-01.
Chapter 6. Oversight, Coordination and Final Provisions
Section 1. Interdepartmental Coordination
Removed: Under the MOG-03 GHQ structure, NSA replaces ACGPA SEC and reports to VCPA; ICC and OPMG report through NSA, with DCS ICC and PMG retaining office responsibilities. JAG remains under ACGPA SUP. CCO (Chief of Community Operations) oversees OPA and IMAC for internal and external community outreach and engagement. Routine diplomacy stays with CCO/IMAC, while material alliances, serious external disputes and significant security concerns are referred to NSC under MOG-09. NSC cannot assume OPMG investigative functions or JAG legal casework.
Added: Under the MOG-03 GHQ structure, NSA replaces ACGPA SEC and reports to VCPA; ICC and OPMG report through NSA, with DCS ICC and PMG retaining office responsibilities. JAG remains under ACGPA SUP. CCO (Chief of Community Operations) oversees OPA and IMA for internal and external community outreach and engagement. Routine diplomacy stays with CCO/IMA, while material alliances, serious external disputes and significant security concerns are referred to NSC under MOG-09. NSC cannot assume OPMG investigative functions or JAG legal casework.
MOG-07, Chapter 1 paragraph (3), provides the specific headquarters-continuity mechanism if AFP_HQ (Room Control) is banned, lost or shut down by Habbo. MOG-09 establishes five permanent NSC seats, limited binding strategic security decisions, clearance for significant external commitments and time-limited protective holds. Its 24-hour provisional hold is subject to CGPA/VCPA confirmation, and individual access restrictions separately require review under MOG-10. Neither MOG grants independent investigative or disciplinary authority to the NSC.
Section 2. Records, Accountability and Access Review
The responsible offices shall maintain restricted registers of classifications, clearance approvals, referrals, incident responses, access restrictions, reviews and disclosure exceptions. Each entry shall identify its owner, authority, reasons, scope, date and review or expiry conditions. An authorised independent superior must be able to audit whether restrictions were properly applied without obtaining unrelated protected case materials. Access and disposal shall be logged where technically possible.
Mistaken records, undisclosed conflicts, retaliation, selective release, unjustified classification and misuse of access or vetting powers shall be subject to review by an uninvolved competent authority. Classification shall not prevent legitimate confidential reporting to OPMG, JAG, the competent command authority or PAC on an applicable appeal. A knowingly fabricated accusation may be referred under the Articles of War, but an unsuccessful good-faith report is not automatically falsification or misconduct MOG-01 Article 17d governs knowing misuse of security authority.
Section 3. Relationship to the Articles of War
Unauthorised disclosure or an OPSEC breach may fall under MOG-01 Article 17 (Violation of Secrecy) where its elements are established. MOG-01 authorises ICC, OPMG and GHQ to issue Articles 17, 17a and 17b; Articles 17c and 17d remain with OPMG and GHQ. ICC issuing authority is limited to infractions within its expressly assigned scope, following independent OPMG/JAG investigation and normal due process. NSA and NSC may coordinate security containment and referrals but do not gain issuing authority through their offices or council membership. The new MOG-01 articles are prospective only.
No new disciplinary offence may be applied retrospectively. Conduct predating the effective publication of Articles 17a–17d must be assessed under the rules then in force. A suspected OPSEC incident is not automatically a proven Article 17 violation; the competent authority must consider the evidence and applicable elements before imposing any sanction.
Section 4. Amendments and Effective Date
Removed: This guideline shall be read consistently with MOG-01, MOG-02, MOG-03, MOG-07, MOG-08 and MOG-09. NSA oversees ICC and OPMG within the MOG-03 reporting structure; CCO (Chief of Community Operations) oversees OPA and IMAC. MOG-09 governs NSC strategic security clearance and 24-hour provisional holds; MOG-10 governs intelligence, vetting, classification and individual access review. Investigations, discipline, discharge, reinstatement and appeals remain with the competent authorities.
Added: This guideline shall be read consistently with MOG-01, MOG-02, MOG-03, MOG-07, MOG-08 and MOG-09. NSA oversees ICC and OPMG within the MOG-03 reporting structure; CCO (Chief of Community Operations) oversees OPA and IMA. MOG-09 governs NSC strategic security clearance and 24-hour provisional holds; MOG-10 governs intelligence, vetting, classification and individual access review. Investigations, discipline, discharge, reinstatement and appeals remain with the competent authorities.
Approved by CGPA and VCPA on 18 November 2026. This guideline enters into force on the announced publication date in PTS. Responsible offices shall review sensitive-position access within 30 calendar days, protect non-public information and complete or schedule mandatory vetting. This initial review period does not permit unauthorised sensitive access. Emergency measures require appropriate duration limits, logging and independent review under this MOG and MOG-09. No retrospective offences or penalties are created.