
Philippine Army
Military Operational Guidelines
MOG-09 | National Security Council
Approved by CGPA and VCPA — 18 November 2026
Effective from formal publication in PTS on the announced commencement date. Supersedes earlier draft and review copies.
Chapter 1. General Provisions
Subsection 1. Establishment and mandate
The National Security Council (NSC) shall be the Philippine Army's standing senior-level security decision and coordination council. It may exercise the specific security clearance and protective powers delegated by this MOG, from its effective date. It is not an independent department, a separate chain of command or a substitute for the executive authority of CGPA and VCPA.
Subsection 2. Scope and application
This guideline governs the NSC, its permanent members, invited advisers and personnel acting on authorised NSC decisions. It applies to significant security threats, intelligence-related risk, sensitive external agreements, serious inter-office incidents and headquarters continuity. Routine office administration, routine diplomacy and minor misconduct remain with their existing offices.
Subsection 3. Definitions
CGPA means Commanding General, Philippine Army; VCPA means Vice Commander; NSA means National Security Advisor, the approved successor designation to ACGPA SEC; ICC means Intelligence Command Center; DCS ICC means Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; OPMG means Office of the Provost Marshal General; PMG means Provost Marshal General; CCO means Chief of Community Operations, the office overseeing internal and external community outreach and engagement; OPA means Office of Public Affairs; IMA means International Military Affairs Center; JAG means Judge Advocate General; GHQ and PAC retain their meanings in MOG-03. NSC security clearance of external commitments is distinct from personnel security clearance under MOG-10. New designations and reporting lines become effective with the published MOG-03/PTS implementation.
Subsection 4. Principles
Security action shall be prompt, proportionate, evidence-based, recorded and reviewable. Credible but unverified intelligence must be identified as such. NSC authority is limited to the powers expressly conferred; departmental reporting lines, legal protections, confidentiality and disciplinary due process continue to apply.
Chapter 2. Composition and Membership
Subsection 5. Permanent seats
The NSC has five permanent seats attached to offices, not individuals: CGPA, VCPA, NSA, DCS ICC and PMG. A vacancy does not dissolve the council.
Seat | Permanent office and responsibility |
|---|---|
1 | CGPA — Chairperson; senior executive oversight |
2 | VCPA — Deputy Chairperson; acts for CGPA when authorised |
3 | NSA — NSC coordination and senior security oversight |
4 | DCS ICC — Intelligence assessment and briefing |
5 | PMG — Military policing and enforcement coordination |
Subsection 6. Chair and coordinator
CGPA chairs the NSC; VCPA acts as Chair when authorised or when CGPA is absent. NSA is the approved successor designation to ACGPA SEC and reports directly to VCPA, coordinating council referrals, urgent consultations, records and implementation tracking. In the approved GHQ structure, ICC and OPMG report through NSA while retaining their DCS ICC and PMG leadership chains. These changes become operative on the announced implementation date. NSA does not independently acquire CGPA/VCPA executive powers.
Subsection 7. Invited advisers
JAG, CCO, OPA, IMA, the relevant ACGPAs and other affected leaders may be invited for matters within their remit. CCO should ordinarily be consulted on external-relations and community-engagement matters affecting its offices. Invited advisers neither vote nor gain blanket access to restricted records. The owning office should have an opportunity to contribute before a non-urgent security decision is made.
Subsection 8. Alternates and vacancies
Acting members may participate only within existing written delegations approved by the Chair or acting Chair. No substitute gains new executive, investigative, access or disciplinary powers merely by attending. Conflicted participants shall be recused and an authorised independent alternative used where possible.
Chapter 3. Powers and Limitations
Subsection 9. Limited binding security authority
Under this MOG, the NSC may (a) grant, condition or withhold security clearance for proposed alliances and significant external arrangements; (b) adopt binding cross-office security coordination requirements within its remit; (c) coordinate major security incident response; and (d) authorise temporary safeguards under Subsection 31. Decisions outside these expressly delegated powers remain recommendations. The NSC does not exercise general command over other offices.
Subsection 10. Command authority and override
CGPA retains final executive approval of alliances, major commitments and PA-wide actions; VCPA exercises delegated authority where validly authorised. NSC security clearance is a required prerequisite to a significant external commitment but does not itself authorise signature or agreement. A withheld clearance may be overridden only by CGPA in a dated written decision documenting the risk accepted and any mitigation. Neither NSA, DCS ICC nor PMG obtains independent CGPA/VCPA powers through NSC membership.
Subsection 11. Investigations, discipline and appeals
The NSC shall not independently investigate misconduct, prosecute, issue infractions, demote, discharge, overturn OPMG decisions or decide appeals. MOG-01 authorises ICC to issue infractions only for Articles 17, 17a and 17b, while OPMG and GHQ hold the issuing authority specified for those and other articles. OPMG and JAG retain investigative jurisdiction, including for security offences and allegations concerning ICC staff. This delegated ICC authority arises from MOG-01, not NSC membership; the NSC may coordinate security risk and refer evidence without determining guilt.
Subsection 12. Access and sanctions
NSC membership does not automatically grant restricted records, accounts, Habbo room rights, Discord moderation controls, bans or appointment powers. Protective actions must be carried out by an existing authorised officer or custodian using valid permissions. Every temporary restriction shall state its purpose, responsible official, scope and review deadline and comply with the individual access procedures in MOG-10 once that guideline takes effect.
Chapter 4. Responsibilities and Referral
Subsection 13. Security responsibilities and external clearance
The NSC oversees strategic security risk, significant threats, intelligence coordination and security decisions concerning external relationships. Under the approved GHQ structure, the Chief of Community Operations (CCO) manages internal and external community outreach and engagement through OPA and IMA. Routine engagement, relationship-building and exploratory discussions do not require advance NSC permission. Before PA enters an alliance, substantial external agreement or other material commitment, CCO/IMA shall submit the intended arrangement for NSC security assessment and clearance. Credible external threats and serious inter-organisational disputes must be referred without delay. ICC supplies intelligence assessments, NSC decides security conditions and CGPA retains final executive approval. Reporting-line changes take effect upon the MOG-03/PTS implementation notice.
Subsection 14. Departmental responsibilities and approved CoC
The GHQ chain of command designates NSA as the successor to ACGPA SEC, reporting directly to VCPA, with ICC and OPMG under NSA. ICC retains intelligence and security-vetting functions and the limited Article 17–17b issuing authority expressly conferred by MOG-01; OPMG retains policing and investigation responsibilities. CCO (Chief of Community Operations) oversees OPA and IMA for internal/external community outreach and engagement; ACGPA SUP oversees JAGS and OSPP; ACGPA PERS oversees HRMC and TECOM. The NSC does not control routine diplomatic and community engagement work. JAG retains its legal and procedural responsibilities. The operative reporting structure is recorded in MOG-03.
Subsection 15. Referral criteria
NSC review is required for significant alliances or external commitments, high-impact inter-organisational disputes, credible major internal or external threats, serious OPSEC breaches, cross-office security risks and threats to essential PA operations. CCO, OPA and IMA may continue normal community outreach, routine diplomatic contact and engagement without obtaining NSC clearance for every conversation. Ordinary misconduct remains within existing processes.
Subsection 16. Submission of referrals
Permanent members, CCO, DCS IMA, relevant OPA personnel and affected office heads may refer matters through an authorised secure channel. Referrals should state the known facts, sources, urgency, affected offices, requested action and conflicts. Urgent credible risks may be reported directly to NSA, CGPA, VCPA, PMG or DCS ICC, with a written record added as soon as practical.
Subsection 17. Screening and safeguarding
NSA shall log referrals, distinguish verified facts from unverified allegations, arrange appropriate ICC/OPMG consultation and promptly escalate urgent matters. A referral may be returned for more information or sent to the competent department. An urgent credible risk must not be delayed solely to wait for a scheduled NSC meeting.
Chapter 5. Meetings and Recommendations
Subsection 18. Ordinary and rapid meetings
Any permanent member may request a meeting. CGPA or VCPA normally authorises ordinary meetings; urgent consultations may be held immediately using an authorised secure channel, including text or voice. Where a rapid action is required before quorum can be assembled, Subsection 31 governs provisional protective measures. The participants, times and resulting decisions must be recorded.
Subsection 19. Quorum and voting
An ordinary binding NSC security decision requires three of five permanent seats, including CGPA or VCPA. A majority of participating eligible members is required, and a tie means the motion fails. A recused member cannot count toward quorum. Emergency protective actions have a separate, narrower two-person rule under Subsection 31 and are not ordinary council votes.
Subsection 20. Decisions, recommendations and dissent
The council should seek consensus. Only decisions within the express scope of Subsection 9 may bind affected offices; other outcomes are recommendations. Decisions shall identify their authority, security justification and responsible implementing office. Material dissent and conflicting risk assessments shall be recorded. CGPA may review or override a security-clearance decision under Subsection 10.
Subsection 21. Executive approval and action log
Every binding NSC decision shall record the approving members, authority, action, limits, implementation owner and review date. Actions requiring separate executive authority may not begin until approved by CGPA, VCPA or the competent decision-maker. NSA keeps the action log but does not gain the power to directly operate another office's systems.
Subsection 22. Minutes and urgent records
NSA shall keep records of attendance, quorum, referrals, evidence or intelligence summary, findings, votes, dissent, instructions, responsible officers and follow-up. An emergency decision can be recorded first in a restricted incident channel but must be formally logged within 24 hours or as soon as feasible.
Chapter 6. Security and Intelligence Handling
Subsection 23. Need-to-know
Sensitive information shall be shared only to the extent required for the receiving person’s assigned role. A permanent NSC seat does not create blanket access to ICC sources, open OPMG investigations, privileged JAG advice or private personnel records.
Subsection 24. Handling designations
For internal handling, a referring office may identify material as routine internal, restricted or highly restricted according to its established procedures. These descriptors guide dissemination within the NSC and do not create an independent classification system overriding existing PA policy.
Subsection 25. Source protection and verification
Intelligence assessments shall distinguish verified facts, credible but unverified information and analytic judgments. Where feasible, source identities shall be minimised or withheld from broad circulation. The NSC shall not present uncorroborated allegations as established facts.
Subsection 26. External disclosure
No council member may publish or transmit sensitive proceedings, evidence or intelligence to an external organisation, another Habbo group or unauthorised Discord channel without approval by the information owner and the competent command authority. Existing incident-reporting and whistleblowing channels shall not be obstructed.
Subsection 27. Security incidents and response
For a significant incident the NSC may coordinate urgent alerts, risk controls and support between affected offices. ICC manages intelligence, OPMG and JAG retain investigations, and authorised custodians implement technical or access safeguards. An NSC incident declaration is not proof of misconduct or a licence to issue sanctions.
Chapter 7. Headquarters Continuity and Emergency Procedure
Subsection 28. Relationship to MOG-07
MOG-07, Chapter 1 paragraph (3), separately defines limited continuity powers if AFP_HQ (Room Control) is banned, lost or shut down by Habbo. That specific trigger remains unchanged. The additional emergency security-hold rules approved in this MOG establish a distinct delegated authority, effective upon formal publication; they do not expand the specific MOG-07 headquarters-continuity trigger.
Subsection 29. Emergency scope and purpose
A continuity declaration under MOG-07 is available only when its specified trigger occurs. Separately, a credible immediate threat to security, protected information or essential operations may justify a provisional protective hold under Subsection 31, provided prompt normal review would be too slow. Emergency authority is limited to preventing immediate harm.
Subsection 30. Temporary headquarters
Whenever reachable, CGPA or VCPA must authorise an interim HQ following consultation with available NSC members. If both are unreachable and the MOG-07 trigger occurs, NSA and DCS ICC may jointly make a provisional interim-location declaration, log the reasons and communicate the temporary controls, subject to CGPA/VCPA review at the first opportunity. This does not authorise leadership or ownership transfers.
Subsection 31. Rapid protective action
For an immediate credible security threat, CGPA or VCPA may authorise urgent measures following consultation with one of NSA, DCS ICC or PMG. If neither CGPA nor VCPA is reachable after reasonable prompt attempts, any two of NSA, DCS ICC and PMG may jointly authorise a limited provisional hold, with at least one being NSA or PMG. Permitted actions: temporarily pause an unsigned alliance or sensitive cooperation, halt a specified risky activity, preserve evidence, or request that an authorised custodian apply narrowly scoped temporary safeguards. Prohibited actions: punishments, permanent account or rank restrictions, surveillance without authority, new ban permissions, ownership transfers and indefinite measures. Record the evidence basis, time, scope, authorisers and implementer; notify CGPA/VCPA immediately. The provisional hold expires after 24 hours unless CGPA/VCPA confirms, changes or ends it in writing. Any continued individual access restriction must also meet MOG-10's applicable review procedures once in force. CGPA/VCPA may terminate a hold immediately.
Subsection 32. Restoration and after-action review
NSA shall maintain an incident chronology and arrange command review of significant emergency actions, preferably within 24 hours. Temporary directions must end once the imminent risk is contained or the expiry is reached. Only the competent office can authorise lasting changes to access, appointments, leadership or sanctions.
Chapter 8. Interdepartmental Relations
Subsection 33. OPMG and NSC membership
PMG is a permanent voting member of the NSC under this approved framework, effective upon publication. OPMG retains ownership of policing, investigation records, case conduct and enforcement procedures under MOG-01. An NSC decision may require inter-office coordination but may not direct investigators to find a person guilty or impose a specific sanction.
Subsection 34. Judge Advocate General
JAG is an invited legal and procedural adviser and does not hold a permanent NSC vote. JAG retains case ownership and existing privileges. NSC shall obtain relevant advice on disputed legal authority, sensitive individual restrictions or proposed changes affecting due process before adopting lasting rules.
Subsection 35. PAC, GHQ and SAC
NSC supplements existing PAC, GHQ and SAC structures with narrowly defined strategic security powers; it does not become an additional superior rank or independently run office personnel, appointments, discipline, appeals or governmental policy. CGPA and VCPA retain their existing executive functions.
Subsection 36. Cross-office coordination
NSC decisions shall be sent to the appropriate office head and implemented through existing command and access-authorisation procedures. CCO retains routine internal and external engagement through OPA and IMA; the NSC oversees security risk and required clearance for significant commitments, not ordinary diplomatic work. Apparent conflict with controlling MOG provisions must be referred to CGPA/VCPA rather than treated as an unrestricted NSC override.
Chapter 9. Accountability, Records and Review
Subsection 37. Recusal and impartiality
Any member whose actions, personal interests or office decisions are directly under review must declare the conflict and be recused. A conflicted member may neither vote nor join a two-person emergency authorisation. If CGPA is implicated, VCPA chairs if unconflicted; if both are implicated, use the existing superior-command route.
Subsection 38. Records and retention
The coordinator shall maintain an appropriately restricted register of referrals, minutes and recommendations in an authorised repository. Records shall be retained, corrected, archived or disposed of under applicable PA policy and any active investigation hold. The NSC shall not invent retention periods or destroy evidence to avoid review.
Subsection 39. Review and challenge
A directly affected office or person may request review of an NSC decision by CGPA/VCPA or the existing competent authority. Emergency holds receive automatic command review under Subsection 31. This process does not replace the ordinary disciplinary, discharge, appeal or vetting procedures.
Subsection 40. Periodic review
NSA shall report at least every six months, and after major security incidents, on clearances considered, rejected and overridden; emergency holds; incidents; expired or outstanding decisions; process concerns; and proposed refinements.
Chapter 10. Implementation and Final Provisions
Subsection 41. Approval and effect
Approved by CGPA and VCPA on 18 November 2026. This MOG establishes the five-seat National Security Council, the security-clearance process and limited emergency-response authority. It takes effect from its announced publication date in PTS. Any changes to positions, reporting or existing disciplinary jurisdiction must be made through the competent authority and the relevant MOG amendments.
Subsection 42. Hierarchy and interpretation
The President/Commander in Chief and valid executive orders retain their superior authority under the established framework. This MOG shall be read consistently with MOG-01, MOG-02, MOG-03, MOG-07, MOG-08 and MOG-10. In a conflict, controlling provisions and competent executive directions prevail until lawfully amended.
Subsection 43. Consequential amendments
The MOG-03 command structure records NSA (formerly ACGPA SEC) reporting to VCPA with ICC and OPMG under NSA; CCO reporting to VCPA with OPA and IMA under CCO; ACGPA SUP overseeing JAGS and OSPP; and ACGPA PERS overseeing HRMC and TECOM. The NSC's role must remain consistent with the MOG-07 headquarters-continuity trigger and with MOG-10 intelligence, vetting and individual access safeguards. Subsequent reporting changes require formal approval and publication.
Subsection 44. Version control
Version 3 — Approved by CGPA and VCPA on 18 November 2026. Establishes NSA as the former ACGPA SEC designation, CCO's outreach remit, five voting NSC seats, limited binding security authority, external security clearance, CGPA override, three-of-five ordinary voting and 24-hour provisional emergency holds. Effective upon publication in PTS on the announced commencement date.